WIENER FINAL FOR PRINT

6/11/2009 3:27 PM

BEST CASS SCENARIO*
Jonathan B. Wiener**
An invitation to add one’s tribute to a festschrift often elicits a reminiscence1—
perhaps as a kind of full disclosure. I was a student in Professor Sunstein’s class in
Administrative Law at Harvard in 1986. It was a large class, in Austin North, driven
briskly onward by the instructor’s keen and relentless questioning. I sat near the back
and often felt anonymous. One afternoon I paid a nervous visit to the high-powered
professor in his office, only to find him youthful, kind, and encouraging. How much
such small moments may inflect a life. After law school and clerkships, I was honored
to find my way somewhere along his—to become a fellow traveler on at least one of the
many paths he has trod. While I was serving in the government and trying to help shape
policies that avoid unintentionally yielding counterproductive results,2 he was writing
about these paradoxes.3 When I came to academia, my first book, on risk-risk tradeoffs,
was lucky to be graced by his foreword4 and to be followed by his own article on the
topic.5 His work on the cognitive case for sensible cost-benefit analysis6 helped shape
my later thoughts on European application of this approach.7 Our critiques of the
precautionary principle have been parallel and intertwined.8 And we have exchanged

* Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Worst-Case Scenarios (Harv. U. Press 2007).
** Perkins Professor of Law and Professor of Environmental Policy & Public Policy Studies, Duke
University; President, Society for Risk Analysis, 2008; University Fellow, Resources for the Future.
1. See Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis without Analyzing Costs or Benefits: Reasonable
Accommodation, Balancing, and Stigmatic Harms, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1895, 1895 n. 1 (2007) (reminiscing
about Sunstein’s early conversation with Richard Posner, in Sunstein’s contribution to an issue of tributes to
Judge Posner). One hopes the honoree of a festschrift enjoys the attention. See Henry Rosovsky, The
University: An Owner’s Manual 218 n. 3 (W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. 1991).
2. Including, as a senior staffer at the Council of Economic Advisers, helping to draft President Clinton’s
Executive Order 12866 on regulatory review. See Exec. Or. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
3. Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 407 (1990).
4. Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword, in Risk versus Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the Environment
vii (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, eds., Harv. U. Press 1995).
5. Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1533 (1996) (reprinted in Cass R.
Sunstein, Risk and Reason: Safety, Law, and the Environment 133 (Cambridge U. Press 2002)).
6. Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. Leg. Stud. 1059 (2000) [hereinafter
Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis]. His interest in cost-benefit analysis dates from his very first
article. Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Separation of Powers, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 1267 (1981).
7. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Better Regulation in Europe, in Current Legal Problems 2006 vol. 59, 447
(Jane Holder & Colm O’Cinneide eds., Oxford U. Press 2007).
8. Among the steps on this trail are chronologically: Cass R. Sunstein, Risk and Reason: Safety, Law, and
the Environment (Cambridge U. Press, 2002) [hereinafter Sunstein, Risk and Reason]; Jonathan B. Wiener,
Precaution in a Multirisk World, in Human and Ecological Risk Assessment: Theory and Practice 1509
(Dennis J. Paustenbach ed., John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary
Principle, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1003 (2003); Jonathan B. Wiener, Whose Precaution after All? A Comment on
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views on climate change, especially regarding how best to engage China and America in
an effective regime to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.9
But Cass Sunstein has traveled so many roads—not only risk regulation and
environmental law, but also constitutional and administrative law, political theory, tort
law, punitive damages, savings and investment, behavioral psychology and economics,
and much more. Somehow, he takes all these roads at the same time, transcending
Frost’s fork. No mortal can keep up. He has been superhumanly prolific. He has called
his favorite legal locale Smallville,10 which, of course, is the boyhood home of Clark
Kent; and knowing that Sunstein has a super Power, it would not be a surprise to see
him take flight—up, up, and away—SuperCass.
To be sure, he has seen farther in part by standing on the shoulders of giants.11 His
antecedents are plain among the pragmatists, from Holmes and James and Pound to
Posner and Breyer. He channels two great Franklins—Roosevelt12 and Benjamin.13 He
has gone beyond his forbears, perhaps the furthest among his own ventures, in his effort

the Comparison and Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems, 13 Duke J. Comp. & Intl. L. 207 (Summer 2003);
Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle (Cambridge U. Press 2005) [hereinafter
Sunstein, Laws of Fear]; Jessica Stern & Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution against Terrorism, 9 J. Risk
Research 393 (2006) (reprinted in Managing Strategic Surprise: Lessons from Risk Management and Risk
Assessment 110 (Paul Bracken, Ian Bremmer, & David Gordon eds., Cambridge U. Press 2008); Cass R.
Sunstein, Precautions & Nature, 137 Daedalus 49, 50 n. 2 (Spring 2008) [hereinafter Sunstein, Precautions &
Nature]; Cass R. Sunstein, Throwing Precaution to the Wind: Why the “Safe” Choice Can Be Dangerous, Bos.
Globe 1C (July 13, 2008)..
9. A sampling of this conversation includes chronologically: Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global
Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 Yale L.J. 677 (1999) (advocating side
payments to engage China in a climate regime, through allocation of tradable emissions allowances); Jonathan
B. Wiener, Something Borrowed for Something Blue: Legal Transplants and the Evolution of Global
Environmental Law, 27 Ecol. L.Q. 1295 (2001); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Designing Global Climate Regulation,
in Climate Change Policy: A Survey 151 (Stephen H. Schneider, Armin Rosencranz & John O. Niles eds., Is.
Press 2002); Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. Wiener, Reconstructing Climate Policy: Beyond Kyoto (AEI
Press 2003); Eric Posner & Cass Sunstein, Pay China to Cut Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Fin. Times (London,
Eng.) 11 (Aug. 6, 2007); Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 Harv. Envtl.
L. Rev. 1 (2007); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change,
107 Colum. L. Rev. 503 (2007); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 Geo. L.J. 1565
(2008); Cass R. Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China? The Complex Climate Change Incentives
of the Leading Greenhouse Gas Emitters, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1675 (2008); Jonathan B. Wiener, Climate Change
Policy and Policy Change in China, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1805 (2008) [hereinafter Wiener, China].
10. See Cass R. Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 2867, 2868 (2007) (imagining
“Smallville” as the ideal place for judicial minimalism).
11. See Stephen Hawking, On the Shoulders of Giants: The Great Works of Physics and Astronomy
(Running Press 2002). For an “infotopian” (per Cass R. Sunstein, Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce
Knowledge (Oxford U. Press 2006)) account of the phrase, see Wikipedia, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stand_on_the_ shoulders_of_giants (accessed Nov. 25, 2008).
12. Cass R. Sunstein, The Second Bill of Rights: FDR’s Unfinished Revolution and Why We Need It More
Than Ever (Basic Bks. 2004).
13. In 2007, Sunstein was awarded the Henry M. Phillips Prize for his lifetime of contributions to the
science and philosophy of jurisprudence by the American Philosophical Society—which was founded in 1743
by Benjamin Franklin. See U. Chi. L. Sch., Cass R. Sunstein Awarded the American Philosophical Society’s
Henry M. Phillips Prize, http://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/sunstein-phillips-prize/index.html (May 17, 2007).
Moreover, Sunstein’s cognitive approach to cost-benefit analysis, as evidenced in Sunstein, Cognition and
Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra n. 6, harkens back to Benjamin Franklin’s “prudential algebra” for making
considered decisions that weigh the pros and cons and avoid “rash steps.” Wiener, supra n. 7, at 483–89
(discussing and quoting Benjamin Franklin, Ltr. from Benjamin Franklin to Joseph Priestley (Sept. 19, 1772),
in Frank Luther Mott & Chester E. Jorgenson, Benjamin Franklin: Representative Selections, with
Introduction, Bibliography, and Notes 348–49 (Am. Bk. Co. 1936)).
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to bring the science of behavioral psychology into debates over law and economics.14
He is not uncontroversial; like any great scholar, he aims to provoke new thinking and
has his share of debates.15 He does not fit easy classifications: He is a social liberal who
wants government decisions to be informed by cost-benefit analysis, cares about
regulatory costs, and wants experts to help correct the public’s errors.16 He admires
juxtapositions that foster deliberative moderation, such as “liberal republican[ism]”17
and “libertarian paternalism.”18
In this essay, focusing on the field of risk regulation, I highlight future challenges
that Sunstein’s work ought to address. The best understanding of his work on risk
regulation points in three further directions: (1) tackling anew the facts/values
dichotomy, (2) reconciling the twin commitments to minimalism and to comprehensive
deliberation, and (3) addressing the future—envisioning future consequences of current
choices and envisioning our own future preferences regarding how we will evaluate
those consequences.
Much of legal reasoning has always run from past to present, from received
precedents to current rules. Some view past rules and preferences as natural, and fear the
risks of new policies. Others view past behaviors and technologies as natural, and fear
the risks of new technologies. But a legal system based on precedent is also necessarily
forward-looking, because each present decision will bind or influence future decisions.
Sunstein has been one of the leaders of a school of thought that looks purposively
to the future: how to design the regulation of emerging risks, how we try to foresee the
future, and where we collectively want society to go.19 Through an eclectic set of tools,
14. See e.g. Behavioral Law and Economics (Cass R. Sunstein ed., Cambridge U. Press 2000); Sunstein,
Laws of Fear, supra n. 8; Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health,
Wealth, and Happiness (Yale U. Press 2008) [hereinafter Thaler & Sunstein, Nudge]; Christine Jolls, Cass R.
Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471 (1998);
Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 683 (1999).
15. E.g. Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 Harv. L.
Rev. 1071 (2006) (reviewing Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle (Cambridge
U. Press 2005)); Cass R. Sunstein, Misfearing: A Reply, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1110, 1123 (2006) (replying to
Kahan et al.); Amy Sinden, Cass Sunstein’s Cost-Benefit Life: Economics for Liberals, 29 Colum. J. Envtl. L.
191 (2004) (critiquing Sunstein’s defense of cognitive approach to cost-benefit analysis); Neil Vidmar,
Experimental Simulations and Tort Reform: Avoidance, Error, and Overreaching in Sunstein et al.’s Punitive
Damages, 53 Emory L.J. 1359 (2004) (disputing the empirical evidence adduced in Cass R. Sunstein et al.,
Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide (U. Chi. Press 2003)); Wiener, China, supra n. 9 (differing with
Sunstein on the prospects for engaging China in a global climate change regime). Many other comments,
critiques, and praises have emerged since Sunstein was named in January 2009 to head OMB/OIRA in the
Obama administration.
16. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State: The Future of Regulatory Protection (ABA 2002). As a
cost-benefit liberal, he is not alone. See Alan S. Blinder, Hard Heads, Soft Hearts: Tough-Minded Economics
for a Just Society (Addison-Wesley Publg. Co. 1987); Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward
Effective Risk Regulation (Harv. U. Press 1993); Wiener, supra n. 7, at 464–65, 471, 474–76.
17. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L.J. 1539, 1539 (1988).
18. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1159, 1159 (2003); Thaler & Sunstein, Nudge, supra n. 14; Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein,
Libertarian Paternalism, 93 Am. Econ. Rev. 175, 175 (May 2003).
19. He has often looked back to the New Deal. See Sunstein, supra n. 12; Cass R. Sunstein, After the
Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State (Harv. U. Press 1990) [hereinafter Sunstein, After the
Rights Revolution]. But this appraisal has been less to applaud the actual New Deal per se than to explore a
mode of governance that is not bound to the baseline of past entitlements and that looks to improving future
outcomes. Meanwhile, he rejects simplistic slogans of progressivism such as the precautionary principle as
well as postmodernism. See Sunstein, Laws of Fear, supra n. 8; Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance,
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including law, economics, psychology, and neuroscience, he has evaluated expert and
public choices and has sought ways to correct systematic mistakes. He seeks reasoning
as a decision method, and seeks reasons for decision failures. His core contributions to
the study of regulation (largely administrative law, but also related fields, including the
regulatory functions of tort, property, and contract law, the constitutional and political
theory of government, and the substance of regulatory design) have been to exhort
institutions and individuals to think through decisions and their future consequences, and
to bring to bear multidisciplinary perspectives on how we actually think. He pushes us
to go beyond—beyond settled rules, static preferences, homo economicus, easy answers,
simple prescriptions—to see homo sapiens20 as we really are and to see forward-looking
law as it could be.
I.

FACTS AND VALUES

A central claim of Sunstein’s work is that people make factual mistakes—heuristic
errors about availability, probability, optimism, and related factors—which ought to be
corrected by expertise.21 But while correcting the public on the facts, he would still
defer to the public on its values.22 He says: “[I]t is undemocratic for officials to neglect
people’s values, [but] it is hardly undemocratic for them to ignore people’s errors of fact.
. . . [I]n a democratic society, officials should respond to people’s values, rather than to
their blunders.”23
Yet Sunstein also favors “debiasing” people’s normative prejudices.24 And he
worries about the situation in which correcting factual errors still leaves in place enough
normative bias to sustain the public’s initial view:
If most citizens wrongly believe that a 55 mph limit will fail to decrease accidents, officials
should not base their decision on that error. If the effect of the change [from 65 to 55 mph]
would be to save a large number of lives, officials should take that fact into account.
To be sure, it is no simple matter to say how officials should respond if most citizens
reject a 55 mph limit even after having been convinced that many lives would be saved as a
result. An obvious question is why, exactly, citizens remain committed to the 65 mph
status quo. Perhaps some normative judgment, not a product of factual error and not
adequately captured in any kind of quantitative analysis, helps to account for their
commitment. My only claim is that officials should not, in democracy’s name, base their
decisions on factual mistakes that are products of bounded rationality. What can be said
for the speed limit example can be said for countless other problems involved in risk

1991 Duke L.J. 607, 617–19 n. 47 (critiquing postmodernism for abandoning reasoning).
20. Sunstein has juxtaposed the supposedly rational homo economicus to the boundedly rational homo
sapiens. See Sunstein, supra n. 15, at 1123; Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 Va.
L. Rev. 205, 207, 207 n. 4 (2001) (citing Richard H. Thaler, From Homo Economicus to Homo Sapiens, 14 J.
Econ. Persp. 133 (Winter 2000)).
21. Cass R. Sunstein, Worst-Case Scenarios (Harv. U. Press 2007); Sunstein, Laws of Fear, supra n. 8.
22. See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 62
(1995) (“[W]hen the differences [in risk evaluation] arise from clashes between the value frameworks of
experts and laypeople[,] . . . there is no reason to defer to experts; democracies should be responsive to the
informed values of their citizens.” (footnote omitted)).
23. Sunstein, supra n. 15, at 1111, 1125.
24. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing through Law, 35 J. Leg. Stud. 199 (2006).
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regulation, including those raised by global warming, terrorism, genetic modification of
food, hurricanes, earthquakes, water pollution, and pesticides.25

The remaining normative bias about risks, even after education on the facts, might
reflect the type of invidious views that Sunstein would seek to “debias” in other areas of
law. To take an example from environmental law: What if the public’s continuing
opposition to the reintroduction of wolves (despite expert evidence—correcting the
public’s erroneous view of the facts—that the risk to humans and livestock is small)
derives from a normative view that wolves are intrinsically evil (“dread”), unfamiliar
(“others”), and unwelcome in human society? What if this same kind of bias or
(literally) prejudice against the unfamiliar, the unnatural, the dread,26 the other, is what
underlies public intolerance of other risks—of new technologies such as genetically
modified foods, or nuclear power plants, or wind turbines (despite expert evidence that
they will not cause significant environmental harm), or immigrants (despite expert
evidence that immigrants will not take away jobs), or foreign-manufactured products
(despite expert evidence that domestic products are just as risky)?27 And meanwhile, the
public may prejudicially tolerate familiar, “natural” risks, such as radon, tobacco,
automobile accidents, weather, domestic products, and others.28
Such situations blur the facts/values distinction. They seem to call for a kind of
debiasing strategy that is both fact-based and value-tinged.29 They call for public
education (both factual and normative), and for leadership. The debate over these
strategies is an old one. Thomas Jefferson favored the preference-reflecting approach: “I
know of no safe repository of the ultimate powers of society but the people themselves;
and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome
discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion by
education.”30
Edmund Burke favored the preference-shaping approach: “Your
Representative owes you, not only his industry, but his judgement; and he betrays,
instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.”31 Perhaps both Jefferson and
Burke might agree that the best instrumental method of “informing the public’s
discretion” is via enlightened leadership that both educates and diverges from current

25. Sunstein, supra n. 15, at 1124–25 (footnote omitted).
26. See Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk (Earthscan Publications Ltd. 2000).
27. See Frank B. Cross, The Subtle Vices behind Environmental Values, 8 Duke Envtl. L. & Policy Forum
151 (1997).
28. See Slovic, supra n. 26; Sunstein, Precautions & Nature, supra n. 8, at 54 (citing James P. Collman,
Naturally Dangerous: Surprising Facts about Food, Health, and the Environment (U. Sci. Bks. 2001));
Jonathan Baert Wiener, Risk in the Republic, 8 Duke Envtl. L. & Policy Forum 1, 11–13 (1997); Jonathan
Baert Wiener, Law and the New Ecology: Evolution, Categories, and Consequences, 22 Ecol. L.Q. 325 (1995).
29. See Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 3 (1991) (advocating policies to
correct the public’s choices when those choices are distorted by market failures such as limited mobility).
30. Ltr. from Thomas Jefferson to Mr. Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson vol. 7,
177 (H.A. Washington ed., 1854). See also Ltr. from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816),
in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson vol. 15, 32, 33 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1904)
(“‘[G]overnments are republican only in proportion as they embody the will of their people, and execute it.’”).
But see Joseph J. Ellis, American Sphinx: The Character of Thomas Jefferson (Alfred A. Knopf 1998) (arguing
that Jefferson was not as pure a populist as is often assumed).
31. Edmund Burke, Speech at the Conclusion of the Poll (Bristol, U.K., Nov. 3, 1774), in The Writings and
Speeches of Edmund Burke vol. 3, 64, 69 (W.M. Elofson & John A. Woods eds., Clarendon Press 1996).
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public opinion to prompt reflection that shapes a new and better public opinion.32
Sunstein, while warning against going too far,33 has argued that American law
should be not just preference-reflecting, but sometimes preference-shaping as well. He
has observed that existing preferences are not preordained but are often themselves a
product of past law.34 Most recently, he has argued that all choices are shaped by some
choice architecture, so that preference-shaping is inevitable.35 He has emphasized
Madison’s view that representative government would
“refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body
of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country and whose
patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial
considerations.”36

And:
For James Madison, national representatives were supposed to deliberate on constituent
preferences, not to implement what constituents “want.” Moreover, the notion that
governments can do only what individual actors might prefer is inconsistent with the
preferences of private actors themselves . . . .
In some settings, government decisions that attempt to shape preferences will produce
significant increases in welfare.
Consider statutes forbidding gambling, or the
consumption of addictive substances, or requiring the use of motorcycle helmets and
seatbelts. In all of these settings, there should be welfare gains from government action,
quite apart from the impact of the conduct in question on third parties.37

Moreover, he has linked this preference-shaping role of government to correcting
intolerant fears—the kinds of prejudicial attitudes that might also arise regarding
unfamiliar risks:

32. See R. Douglas Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action 10–16 (Yale U. Press 1990) (successful
representatives do not just reflect current public views but respond to and help shape citizens’ “potential
preferences”).
33. Sunstein, supra n. 17, at 1543 (arguing that it is desirable to “avoid the risks of tyranny that are
associated with active and self-conscious preference-shaping by public officials. The most objectionable
exercises of governmental power are often associated with approaches that see character formation as an end of
politics.”).
34. Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 106, 132 (2002). “If the endowment
effect is at work, there is no avoiding a legal effect on workers’ preferences. Whatever the content of the legal
rule, preferences will be affected (if there is an endowment effect). A preference-shaping effect, from the
default rule, is inevitable.” Id. “It should be recalled here that, as a historical matter, enthusiasm for markets
was itself a product, not of neutrality about preferences, but instead of a desire to produce preferences of a
certain sort, while encouraging independence, entrepreneurship, and indifference to certain ascriptive
characteristics.” Id. at 132 n. 91 (citing Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political
Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph 69–113 (Princeton U. Press 1977)).
35. See Thaler & Sunstein, Nudge, supra n. 14.
36. Cass. R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 41 (1985) (footnote
omitted) (quoting James Madison, The Federalist No. 10, in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison & John Jay,
The Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States 54, 60 (Paul Leicester Ford ed.,
Mershon Co. Press 1898)).
37. Cass R. Sunstein, Two Faces of Liberalism, 41 U. Miami L. Rev. 245, 246, 251 (1986) (footnote
omitted); id. at 251 (a “species of liberal thought—reflected in much of modern law—sees the collective
selection of preferences as a natural and desirable feature of government. This species of liberalism is, of
course, subject to abuse. Those abuses can be controlled, however, thus promoting both welfare and autonomy
. . . .”).
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[T]he Constitution does not always allow gratification of private preferences to serve as a
basis for government action; in fact, preference shaping is an important constitutional
principle. The equal protection clause is a good illustration. In a recent case involving the
mentally retarded, for example, the Supreme Court said that the Constitution prohibited
legislators from acting on the basis of their constituents’ fear of and revulsion toward the
mentally retarded.38

This kind of fear and revulsion is arguably similar to the fear of unfamiliar, dread
risks in general. Evolutionary psychology suggests that early humans survived by
trusting clan members and distrusting the “other,” the outsider; early evolutionary
selection pressure may have favored quick recognition of faces as clan member (friend)
or outsider (foe).39 If so, this kind of reaction may be part of the basis of the
unfamiliarity/dread heuristic in risk perception. Modern neuroscience indicates that
before considered deliberation can occur in the frontal cortex, the amygdala processes an
immediate discrimination between threats or not, such as snake or stick.40 This basic
discrimination may be related to base discrimination—to invidious fear and revulsion
against the unfamiliar other.41
Thus, selective concern about risks—familiarity, naturalness, availability, and
related heuristic errors—may derive from the same kinds of normative biases that give
rise to selective (unequal) treatment of insiders and outsiders. Without claiming that
risks deserve “equal protection,” one can see how public evaluation of risk may be
affected by both factual errors and normative biases, and how some of these normative
biases may be closely related to the kinds of unequal treatment or discrimination for
which Sunstein has counseled preference-shaping law. Sunstein has observed that
preference distortions can be analogous to market failures, such that our “preferences
about preferences,” or second-order preferences, would lead us to favor government
intervention to shape private choices.42
Perhaps these kinds of inherited prejudices, developed long ago as survival tactics,
are now vestigial traits that disserve modern society but that continue to be manifest in
normative biases about types of risks, even after facts are clarified and understood. If so,
shouldn’t the preference-shaping function of law be deployed to nudge these value
frames?
More deeply, if choice architecture is inescapable (as Thaler and Sunstein argue)
38. Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1129, 1130 (1986)
(discussing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)).
39. See Virginia Slaughter, Valerie E. Stone & Catherine Reed, Perception of Faces and Bodies, 13 Current
Directions in Psychol. Sci. 219 (2004); Elizabeth Svoboda, Faces, Faces Everywhere, 156 N.Y. Times F1, F6
(Feb. 13, 2007).
40. Joseph LeDoux, The Amygdala, 17 Current Biology R868 (2007).
41. Relatedly, humans appear to respond more strongly to an identifiable individual than to a larger number
of unidentified people. See Karen E. Jenni & George Loewenstein, Explaining the “Identifiable Victim Effect,”
14 J. Risk & Uncertainty 235 (1997). This normative bias appears to lead people to favor saving an identifiable
individual over even preventing mass calamities. See Paul Slovic, “If I Look at the Mass I Will Never Act”:
Psychic Numbing and Genocide, 2 Judm. & Dec. Making 79 (Apr. 2007).
42. Sunstein, supra n. 38, at 1169, 1173. Similarly, Sunstein has more recently commented: “The most
serious problems with [economic analysis of law] are normative, above all in the suggestion that all preferences
deserve support, regardless of their origins or of the reasons brought forward on their behalf. Some reasons for
action are properly blocked, even if they are based on private willingness to pay.” Cass R. Sunstein, On
Philosophy and Economics, 19 QLR 333, 347 (2000).
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and if choice architecture shapes value choices, then the facts of choice architecture (and
the selection among such architectures) inevitably shapes expressed preferences.43 If so,
Sunstein’s dichotomy between correcting facts and deferring to public values would need
to be bridged, and values would need to be nudged.
This question remains a challenge to Sunstein’s effort to urge attention to
behavioral psychology as a critique of cognitive appraisal of facts, while being at times
deferential to public values and at other times favorable toward nudging public values.
This clash among competing approaches—fact-correcting and value-respecting,
preference-reflecting and preference-shaping—could pose a Cass-Cass tradeoff, or even
a Worst Cass Scenario, which ideally Sunstein can help resolve. Public officials making
policy must exercise judgment, not just follow the facts, so they must inescapably choose
among values. The presidential candidacy of Barack Obama is a case in point:
Remarkably, he combined calm and deliberative reasoning about the vital issues facing
the country44 with an inspirational rhetoric calling the American people to join together,
to embrace change, to become our better selves, to create our future history.
II.

MINIMALISM VS. COMPREHENSIVE DELIBERATION

Sunstein wants a law for the future, like the New Deal move away from precedentbound common law, that is able to deal with new threats and opportunities rather than
relying only on the accretion of past tradition. He favors a kind of comprehensive
deliberation that considers the full consequences of decisions, that does not fall prey to
status quo bias or to simple answers like the precautionary principle.45 The tools of this
deliberation include cost-benefit analysis, risk tradeoff analysis, cost-effectiveness
analysis and market-based incentive instruments, and a healthy (though not stifling) dose
of executive oversight.46
But he recognizes that a forward-moving project may be vulnerable to discord and,
therefore, proposes that institutions should move cautiously. In order to secure
agreement across diverse viewpoints, he favors a kind of incrementalism that he labels
minimalism, and a kind of partial consensus that he labels incompletely theorized
agreements.47
The challenge here is that these two approaches—comprehensive deliberation, and
minimalism—are in some tension. Incrementalism or minimalism can counsel
incomplete analysis of policy impacts, “muddling through” with a limited assessment of
43. Thaler & Sunstein, Nudge, supra n. 14.
44. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Obama I Know: Terrific Listener Goes Wherever Reason Takes Him, Chi.
Trib. 27 (Mar. 14, 2008); Jonathan B. Wiener, Want a President Who Weighs the Risks Well, News & Observer
A11 (Oct. 30, 2008).
45. See Sunstein, Laws of Fear, supra n. 8; Sunstein, Precautions & Nature, supra n. 8, at 57 (“A better
approach would be to acknowledge that a wide variety of adverse effects may come from inaction, regulation,
and everything between. Such an approach would attempt to consider all of those adverse effects, not simply a
subset.”). This argument is, of course, not unique to Sunstein. And there had been critiques of the
precautionary principle before Sunstein; what Sunstein added is, most notably, the behavioral psychology
approach to understanding law and economics.
46. See Sunstein, Risk and Reason, supra n. 8.
47. See Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (Harv. U. Press
1999); Sunstein, supra n. 10; Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1733
(1995).
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each step.48 But each incremental or minimal step may be a partial solution to a larger
problem, thereby inducing shifts and side effects that create new problems.49 The
ambition of forward-looking law that considers full consequences requires a more
synoptic, comprehensive deliberation (subject to the costs of such deliberation) than
minimalism appears to offer.
This may be a question of institutions. Sunstein may argue that comprehensive
analysis is better undertaken by the administrative state while the courts are better at
minimalism.50 But judicial review—taking a hard look, or at least considering the full
array of consequences—may at times be needed to ensure that administrative agencies
attend to the consequences of the agencies’ decisions. On the other hand, Sunstein
points out that designing regulatory policy well is important across many issues, whereas
review by the courts is inherently episodic and narrow.51
Meanwhile, perhaps Sunstein’s minimalism can be combined with a
comprehensive analysis of impacts.52 Some critics of synoptic analysis fear its result is
indeed to impede bold action—to induce paralysis by analysis.53 But synoptic analysis
also enables broad policy changes that regulate comprehensively with fewer adverse side
effects, thus avoiding backlash and gridlock. The question is whether minimalism in
degree of legal change can be married to maximalism (or optimalism) in the scope of
consequences assessed. This seems more plausible if one considers that Sunstein’s
version of consequentialism is not fully monetized economic optimization, but rather the
cognitive case for cost-benefit balancing: ensuring that the decision-maker considers the
full set of important impacts.54 This approach is actually supported by cost-benefit
principles, whenever striving for monetized precision would distract the decision-maker
from other more important (but more difficult to quantify) impacts. That is, a
proportionate analysis sensitive to decision costs would tend toward the “cognitive” case
for cost-benefit analysis, or what I have called “Warm Analysis.”55
And Sunstein’s commitment to cost-benefit analysis is not intended or designed to
impede regulation. Unlike the notion that cost-benefit analysis is anti-regulatory,56
Sunstein’s approach is evenhanded, using impact assessment both to restrain bad

48. See Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 Pub. Administration Rev. 79, 81
(1959).
49. See Sunstein, supra n. 4; Jonathan Baert Wiener, Managing the Iatrogenic Risks of Risk Management, 9
Risk 39 (1998).
50. Sunstein, supra n. 10, at 2882 (“[I]t remains possible to argue that first-order perfectionism makes sense
for political participants and their representatives, even if judges should be more firmly constrained.”).
51. See Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution, supra n. 19, at 608–09.
52. This may be where Sunstein is heading with Cass R. Sunstein, Trimming, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1049
(2009).
53. See Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk
Analysis, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 562, 625 (1992).
54. See Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra n. 6, at 1060. This approach may better invite
an incompletely theorized agreement to use cost-benefit analysis among people of divergent viewpoints. See
Cass R. Sunstein, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis for Everyone? 53 Admin. L. Rev. 299, 300 (2001).
55. Wiener, supra n. 7, at 483–89.
56. See Richard L. Revesz & Michael A. Livermore, Retaking Rationality: How Cost-Benefit Analysis Can
Better Protect the Environment and Our Health 9–10 (Oxford U. Press 2008) (critiquing Sunstein and others
for having positioned cost-benefit analysis as anti-regulatory in the past, though ultimately arguing that costbenefit analysis can also be pro-regulatory).
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regulation and to prompt good regulation; to consider benefits, costs, ancillary harms,
and ancillary benefits.57 (Sunstein could help us evaluate whether White House costbenefit review should cover not only decisions to regulate, and to deregulate, but also not
to act;58 and whether it should apply to “independent” agencies and to a wider arena of
policy types including counterterrorism,59 banking and finance, trade measures,
international agreements, and others.) This is Ben Franklin’s cost-benefit analysis,60 and
it recalls the early ambition of NEPA to protect the environment through cost-benefit
analysis.61 Similarly, our work on risk-risk tradeoffs and cost-benefit analysis has been
criticized as anti-regulatory,62 when our entire point was to point the way toward
analysis of the “full set of consequences”63 and thus to “regulations that will be effective
in achieving their own goals.”64 Analyzing how medical care may sometimes injure
patients is not anti-medicine; it is pro-health. Likewise, analyzing risk-risk tradeoffs
induced by regulation is not anti-regulation; it is pro-effective protection.65
III. THE FUTURE
The most important challenge for Sunstein’s work on risk regulation is to develop
a richer account of the future. While Sunstein writes extensively on policy analysis,
risks, precaution, and cognitive heuristics, he has so far not said much about how experts
and the public should actually envision future consequences and future preferences. His
chapter on “The Future” in Worst-Case Scenarios, for example, is devoted to the issue of
whether to discount future impacts, but not to how those forecasts and scenarios of future
impacts are developed and tested. How do we envision what will happen? This is not
just the province of risk assessment, but also of policy analysis and judgment: analyzing

57. See Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal Regulation?
Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1489, 1489 (2002); Sunstein, supra n. 54, at 313–
14.
58. Revesz & Livermore, supra n. 56, at 174 (proposing that advocacy groups could appeal agency denials
of petitions for rulemaking to OMB/OIRA for cost-benefit review of such decisions not to act).
59. See Stern & Wiener, supra n. 8, at 439 (advocating joint OIRA-NSC impact assessments of proposed
counterterrorism measures, both domestic and international).
60. See supra n. 13.
61. See Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Commn., 449 F.2d 1109, 1117–18
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (Skelly Wright, J., finding that the EIS provision in NEPA section 102(2)(C) requires costbenefit analysis of federal projects in order to take into account their previously neglected environmental
costs). The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently held that NEPA requires only a “purely procedural” exercise of
informed decision-making—a so-called “stop and think” exercise—with no substantive criteria for such
decisions. See Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227–28 (1980).
62. See Revesz & Livermore, supra n. 56.
63. John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in Risk versus Risk supra n. 4,
at 2.
64. Sunstein, supra n. 4, at viii.
65. Wiener, supra n. 49, at 42–43(“Concern about countervailing risks has no political brand. Both
conservatives, liberals and centrists worry about the dysfunctions of the regulatory state. Each may emphasize
different examples—conservatives may worry about the side effects of health and environmental rules, while
liberals may worry about the side effects of dams, police practices and harsh criminal penalties—but their
concerns have the same analytic basis. Countervailing risks are a generic challenge. The first modern
environmental law, NEPA, was a response to the countervailing risks of government interventions to achieve
non-environmental policy goals such as transportation and electrification. Worrying about countervailing risks
is not anti-environmental, or anti-law-and-order, or anti-regulatory, it is pro-results; it is the sober habit of the
pragmatic optimist.” (footnote omitted)).
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the future consequences of alternative policies and choosing among those policies. This
requires foreseeing, envisioning—what the future will bring, and what our future
preferences will be.
This area seems ripe for a Cassian66 look at cognition and prediction—what
Harvard’s Daniel Gilbert and Daniel Shachter call “prospection” or “the prospective
brain.”67 Gilbert argues that only humans think about the future,68 and yet that
prospection is hampered by our brains’ limited capacity to imagine futures that have not
yet happened.69 Schachter, Addis, and Buckner find that we use the same parts of the
human brain (what they call “neural machinery”) to envision the future that we also use
to process memories.70 The implication is that human prospection is tied to the past, and
thus to the biases of the availability heuristic.71 Moreover, Gilbert argues that humans
err in predicting their own future preferences—our own future selves.72
And there is a venerable literature on the development of scenarios, from de
Jouvenel73 to Kahn and Wiener74 to Schwartz75 and others, which emphasizes the value
of careful attention to detail, context, and the intersection of multiple trends.
The challenge here is to move from the cognitive or behavioral psychology of risk
perceptions—explaining why people perceive risks as they do—to the cognitive
psychology and planning tools of policy comparison—explaining why people envision
the future as they do, and how to do better. Schachter et al. write:
As we and others have argued, since planning for the future is a task of paramount adaptive
importance, it makes sense to conceive of the brain as a fundamentally prospective organ
that is designed to use information from the past and present to generate predictions about
the future. Such a perspective encourages us to view memory as a key component of the
prospective brain that helps to generate simulations of possible future events that contribute
to the formation of plans and predictions. Such a perspective calls for a shift not only in
conceptual emphasis, but also a change in methodology. Rather than focusing
predominantly on assessing memory with tasks that query the past, greater emphasis
should be placed on the development of tasks that capture how memory is used to simulate,

66. In the tradition of “Coasean.”
67. Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Prospection: Experiencing the Future, 317 Sci. 1351, 1352
(2007) [hereinafter Gilbert & Wilson, Prospection]; Daniel L. Schacter, Donna Rose Addis & Randy L.
Buckner, Episodic Simulation of Future Events: Concepts, Data, and Applications, 1124 Annals N.Y. Acad.
Sci. 39, 39 (2008). So far, Sunstein has written of scenarios, but not of prospection, though he does cite the
earlier paper by Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Miswanting: Some Problems in the Forecasting of
Future Affective States, in Feeling and Thinking: The Role of Affect in Social Cognition 178, 179 (Joseph P.
Forgas ed., Cambridge U. Press 2000) [hereinafter Gilbert & Wilson, Miswanting] (using the term
“miswanting” to apply to a lack of coordination between what a person wants and likes).
68. Daniel Gilbert, Stumbling on Happiness 4 (Alfred A. Knopf 2006).
69. Gilbert & Wilson, Prospection, supra. n. 67, at 1352.
70. Schacter, Addis & Buckner, supra n. 67, at 39.
71. Id. at 55; see Carey K. Morewedge, Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, The Least Likely of Times:
How Remembering the Past Biases Forecasts of the Future, 16 Psychol. Sci. 626, 626 (2005).
72. Gilbert, supra n. 68, at 209–10.
73. Bertrand de Jouvenel, The Art of Conjecture (Nikita Lary trans., Basic Bks. 1964).
74. Herman Kahn & Anthony J. Wiener, The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on the Next ThirtyThree Years (Macmillan 1967).
75. Peter Schwartz, The Art of the Long View: Paths to Strategic Insight for Yourself and Your Company
(Doubleday 1996).
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plan, and predict the future.76

This shift in focus is consistent with others’ advice to compare policy options and
their impacts, not compare risks per se, because comparing risks does not help us decide
which policies to adopt.77 One risk might be large but intractable; another might be
smaller but easily reduced. And policies might reduce risks but pose countervailing risk
side effects. It is policies that matter.
Focusing on the future also adds a challenge for consideration of preferences: We
need to look not only at current preferences, but at our future preferences regarding the
future consequences of current policy choices.
Further, it puts emphasis on the dynamic character of policy-making. Risk
regulation is not a one-off affair. The essence of risks is that they occur in an uncertain
future. Our errors not only in risk perception but in policy prospection mean that we will
always be readjusting to changing circumstances. Risk regulation is inescapably an
iterative process of learning, adaptive management, and updating. Precautionary
policies, if adopted, must be provisional, with continued research and opportunities for
revision. Ex ante impact assessment of risk regulation requires validation—ex post
evaluations to appraise policy outcomes and to test and improve ex ante assessment
methods.
From one perspective, all we have is the present: The past is gone, and the future is
inchoate. From another perspective, the present is but an instant, lost already; the past is
not recorded but reconstructed by our memories; and all we can really grasp and shape is
the endless stream of the future.
IV. BEST CASS SCENARIO
It is easy to imagine worst case scenarios in which all our best ideas, including
even Cass Sunstein’s, are no match for the vicissitudes of the future. But provided we
consider all important impacts and avoid “rash steps,” the power of good ideas to meet
challenges and parry risks has a decent track record in human history. As Barbara
Tuchman argued cogently in her classic The March of Folly, governments fail when they
forsake thinking and reason in favor of impulse and ideology.78
Good government needs to think through problems seriously (and yet not
obsessively). National leadership needs to take seriously the recursive character of the
challenge: evaluate (prospectively), decide, experience, revise, and then evaluate and
decide again. If regulatory agencies give the nudges, if they design the choice
architecture, then national administration should be alert for errors or biases or interest
group distortions in those architectures. In Sunstein’s terminology, leadership should be
a second-order perfectionist, a choice architect to guide the choice architects—nudging
the front-line nudgers (the agencies) to do a better job at policy design, prospection,
evaluation, and revision. In such a world, we would ask not quis custodiet ipsos
custodes (who will watch the watchers), but who will nudge the nudgers? Perhaps
76. Schacter, Addis & Buckner, supra n. 67, at 56 (citations omitted).
77. See John D. Graham & James K. Hammitt, Refining the CRA Framework, in Comparing Environmental
Risks: Tools for Setting Government Priorities 93 (J. Clarence Davies ed., RFF Press 1996).
78. Barbara W. Tuchman, The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam 4 (Alfred A. Knopf 1984).
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Sunstein, at OMB/OIRA, as in academia, will show the way. That would be a Best Cass
Scenario.
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